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I. Introduction
Over the decades, courts have regularly described certain principles of
employment discrimination law in terms evocative of a species of physical trial,
akin perhaps to calf roping or alligator wrestling. Courts have "grappled,"'
* Director, Community Legal Practice Center, and Assistant Clinical Professor of Law,
Washington and Lee University School of Law. This manuscript presents, and elaborates on,
the author's remarks at the Washington and Lee University School of Law Student Notes
Presentation (Sept. 19, 2003).
1. See, e.g., Misra v. Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, 248 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir.
2001) (stating that courts have "grappled" with the question of whether Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 offers Smithsonian employees a remedy for employment discrimination);
Cox v. City of Memphis, 230 F.3d 199, 203 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Only a handful of lower courts
have grappled with the issue of tainted eligibility lists."); Devlin v. Transp. Communications
445
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"wrestled, ''2 and "struggled"3 with the slippery concepts that are the hallmarks
of the field and observers still conclude that some of the unruly targets of these
exertions remain unsubdued.4  The tripartite evidentiary framework for
disparate treatment cases, which the United States Supreme Court first
articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,5 has been among the most
difficult employment discrimination doctrines to pin down.6 Moreover, when
Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,7 established the right to a jury trial
for Title VII claims, 8 it exacerbated the difficulties that McDonnell Douglas
Int'l Union, 173 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1999) ("grappling" with the differences between
pregnancy-based and age-based employment discrimination); West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d
744, 754 (3d Cir. 1995) (commenting that courts grapple with the question of defining when an
unlawful employment practice actually occurs).
2. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604, 608 (10th Cir. 1998)
(contending that courts have "wrestled with the relationship between a disability and conduct
related to that disability" in cases involving disability-based employment discrimination);
Lindsey v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1100 (11 th Cir. 1987) ("wrestling with the
liquidated damages issue" in a disparate treatment case); Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989,995 (2d
Cir. 1985) ("wrestling" with the interrelationships of the tripartite evidentiary framework in a
religious discrimination case).
3. See, e.g., Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 2001)
(stating that courts have struggled with the question of whether a plaintiff"may" or "must" show
a prima facie case); ladimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1999) (contending that
"courts have struggled" in applying the tripartite evidentiary framework in some cases); Smith v.
Borough of Wilkinson, 147 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1998) (asserting that courts have "struggled"
to define the evidentiary framework used in employment discrimination cases).
4. See, e.g., Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A
Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 659,
659 (1998) (contending that the analysis adopted by the Supreme Court in employment
discrimination cases has been "heavily criticized byjudges, practitioners, and academics alike");
Michael L. Murphy, Note, The Federal Courts' Struggle with Burden Allocation for
Reinstatement Claims Under the Family and Medical Leave Act: Breakdown of the Rigid Dual
Framework, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 1081, 1095-1129 (2001) (discussing the existing confusion in
the courts under the Family Medical Leave Act); John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in
Employment Discrimination Law: Slouching Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law,
53 MERCER L. REv. 709, 749 (2002) (commenting that courts have been unable to clarify what
intentional discrimination means because it is indefinable).
5. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a summary of the
tripartite framework, see infra note 21.
6. Ironically, because of the sheer numbers of disparate treatment claims filed each year,
it is likely that the McDonnell Douglas framework is also the most frequently applied doctrine.
Westlaw's KeyCite listing for the decision, last checked on October 14, 2003, reflects 44,912
entries, and notes that the decision has been cited or applied in fifty-two Supreme Court and
4,807 Court of Appeals decisions in the three decades since it was decided.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 a(c) (2003), added by § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991; Pub. L.
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991), at § 1977A(a).
THE IMPERATIVE OF INSTRUCTING ON PRETEXT
posed. The tripartite framework, developed and refined for the analysis of
evidence at summary judgment or a bench trial, was not easily imported into
the rubric ofjury trials, and courts struggled with translating its core concepts
into common speech understandable by juries.9
It is onto this well-trammeled pitch that William J. Vollmer steps with his
excellent Note. In Pretext in Employment Discrimination Litigation:
Mandatory Instructions for Permissible Inferences?,0 Mr. Vollmer
meticulously documents a split that has developed in the Courts of Appeals
over whether to mandate a jury instruction on pretext in the appropriate
disparate treatment case." Mr. Vollmer crystallizes the arguments for" and
against 13 requiring a pretext instruction and ultimately concludes that the
balance weighs in favor of leaving the matter to the trial court's discretion.'
4
As I discuss below, Mr. Vollmer's conclusion has considerable merit and, when
viewed through the lens of the law that applies to the question of how (or if) to
instruct juries on permissible inferences, it seems almost inevitable. But I
propose to push two aspects of Mr. Vollmer's discussion further in an effort to
add some luster to the case in favor of requiring the instruction.
Part II provides an obligatory summary of the post-1991 Civil Rights Act
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the question of pretext.15 In Part I of this
Article, I will explore whether instructions that do not address pretext are truly
adequate to charge the jury on the applicable law in a disparate treatment case
in which the plaintiff has made a threshold showing of pretext. Next, in Part
IV, I will consider Mr. Vollmer's suggestion that any risk inhering in the failure
to give such an instruction can truly be avoided through the arguments of
9. See EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., 3A FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 104.04 (4th ed. 2000 Supp.) (proposing a simplified instruction and collecting cases that
address the propriety of reciting the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting formula in instructions
to the jury); see also infra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing model instructions
adopted by the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
10. William J. Vollmer, Note, Pretext in Employment Discrimination Litigation:
Mandatory Instructions for Permissible Inferences?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 407 (2004).
1I. See id. at 417-29 (discussing the circuit split over whether courts should instruct a
jury that it may infer intentional discrimination if it does not believe the defendant employer's
justification for the discriminatory result).
12. See id. at 429-35 (stating the argument for mandating the use of this inference injury
instructions).
13. See id. at 435-42 (describing the argument against requiring the pretext instruction).
14. See id. at 443-44 (concluding that the prudent and conservative path is that this
decision should fall within the discretion of the trial court).
15. Readers seeking a complete chronicle of this evolution should refer to Mr. Vollmer's
thorough discussion. See Vollmer, supra note 10, at 413-16 (discussing the development of the
McDonnell Douglas framework).
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counsel. Finally, I will suggest that a shift in perspective on these two points
may be sufficient to tip the balance in favor of requiring the instruction in an
appropriate case.
II. The Supreme Court's Pretext Jurisprudence
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was one of the watersheds in
the development of the United States' national conscience regarding citizens'
entitlement to equal treatment regardless of sex, skin color, ethnicity or
religious affiliation. Of particular significance was Title VII of the Act,16 which
protected against discrimination in employment. While the ideals undergirding
Title VII may at first seem relatively easy to articulate, the determination of
whether a particular employer's decision runs afoul of the statute has proved
more difficult. First, Title VII was long on impact, but in relative terms it was
somewhat short on exegesis of the principles it sought to mandate.' 7 Moreover,
while the effectiveness of Title VII in ending employment discrimination
remains the subject of dispute, it seems clear that civil rights era enactments at
least have had the effect of forcing most discriminatory animus underground.1
8
As a consequence, in a disparate treatment case-a case in which the alleged
discrimination is not pegged to a particular policy or practice and its effects, but
to a specific decision allegedly made with discriminatory animus-proof will
almost necessarily be made "indirectly," through the use of circumstantial
evidence and the inferences that flow from it.' 9
16. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-i 7).
17. For example, while taking a stab at defining, inter alia, "employer" (42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b)), "religion" (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)), and "because of sex" (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)),
and at establishing what sorts of employer decisions were and were not subject to scrutiny under
the Act, the Act leaves undefined such core terms as "discriminate," "color," and "race."
18. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 459-60 (2001) (opining that, while smoking guns are
"largely things of the past," "[r]acial and gender inequality persists in many places of
employment").
19. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000)
(demonstrating that, because there is often no direct evidence of discriminatory intent, "Courts
of Appeals... have employed some variant of the framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas
to analyze ... claims that are based principally on circumstantial evidence."); U.S. Postal Serv.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) ("All courts have recognized that the
question facing triers of fact is both sensitive and difficult .... There will seldom be
'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes.").
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In its 1973 decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,20 the Supreme
Court took on the problem of proving discrimination in the disparate treatment
arena. Title VII does not define discrimination, and the Court sensibly avoided
doing so. Instead, the McDonnell Douglas Court established the now familiar
tripartite structure within which evidence could be conceptually ordered so that
the fact-finder could determine if discrimination had indeed occurred. 21
Since McDonnell Douglas, courts have variously grappled, wrestled, and
struggled with the tripartite proof structure, necessitating regular input and
glossing by the Supreme Court.22  However, as Mr. Vollmer accurately
observes, in the past decade the Court has increasingly focused on the third
aspect of the McDonnell Douglas tripartite structure, namely the requirement
that the plaintiff show that the defendant's articulated reason for its conduct
was actually a pretext for illegal discrimination.23
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,24 the Supreme Court attempted to
clarify the nature of the plaintiff's burden of proof at the third stage of the
McDonnell Douglas progression. The Court concluded that in order to prevail
the plaintiff must demonstrate "both that the [employer's proffered] reason [for
its decision] was false, and that discrimination was the real reason" for the
challenged decision.25 In so holding, the Hicks Court emphasized that the
ultimate fact of discrimination vel non could be inferred from the falsity of the
employer's explanation coupled with the plaintiff's prima facie case.26
20. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
21. Id. at 802-05. Put simply, McDonnell Douglas held that in a disparate treatment case,
the plaintiff first has the burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 802. The
elements of the prima facie case are not fixed, but are expected to be sufficient to eliminate the
traditional, nondiscriminatory reasons for employment decisions. Id. at 802 n. 13. For example,
in a termination case the plaintiff would be expected to show that she was a member of the
protected class, that she was qualified for or was adequately performing her job, and that she
was fired and the position was not eliminated after her discharge. Once the plaintiff's prima
facie burden is met, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. Id. at 802. Once the employer meets this burden of production, the plaintiff will prevail
if she proves that the articulated reason was a pretext or "cover-up," and that discrimination was
the real reason for the decision. Id. at 804.
22. See generally Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); Texas Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
23. See Vollmer, supra note 10, 414 n.46 (noting that recent legal disputes regarding the
McDonnell Douglas framework have centered primarily on the pretext part of the test).
24. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
25. Id. at515.
26. See id. at 511 (explaining that the fact-finder's disbelief of the defendant's explanation,
combined with the plaintiff's showing of a prima facie case, is enough to infer intentional
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Despite the Hicks Court's attempt to settle the question of pretext, courts
continued to be confused over whether, under any circumstances, falsity plus
the prima facie case would be sufficient to show pretext." Ultimately, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc.2" to address the circuit split.29 The Reeves Court finally resolved the
matter, concluding that a jury may indeed infer discrimination from a false
explanation alone.30 It is in this context that the question of how (or if) to
instruct the jury on pretext arises.
III. The Adequacy of Jury Instructions that Fail to Address Pretext
Mr. Vollmer suggests that the argument against a pretext instruction
"begins with the principle that ajudge need not instruct the jury on permissible
inferences."' It is indeed a correct statement of the law that instructions on
inferences are generally left to the discretion of the court.3' Thus, if one
accepts that the categorization of pretext as a "permissible inference" is the
appropriate jumping-off point, any discussion about whether the pretext
instruction may be required takes on a flavor of inevitability.
However, the terrain of the argument33 changes somewhat when the
jumping-off point shifts from the law as it applies to instructing on inferences
to the axiom that "[i]t is the inescapable duty of the trial judge to instruct the
jurors, fully and correctly, on the applicable law of the case, and to guide,
direct, and assist them toward an intelligent understanding of the legal and
discrimination).
27. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 140 (documenting the conflict among the courts of appeals).
28. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
29. Id. at 140.
30. See id. at 146-47 (concluding that, although proof that the employer's proffered
reason is incredible does not necessarily establish intentional discrimination, it is permissible for
the fact-finder "to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's
explanation").
3 1. Vollmer, supra note 10, at 435.
32. See Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[A] judge need not
deliver instructions describing all valid legal principles. Especially not when the principle in
question describes a permissible, but not an obligatory, inference.").
33. It should not go unrecognized that in his balanced and thoughtful Note, Mr. Vollmer
actually argues quite convincingly for the position that a pretext instruction may be required.
See Vollmer, supra note 10, at 429-35. His discussion of the role of pretext in Hicks and
Reeves is quite compelling, id. at 431-35, as is his suggestion that a pretext instruction would
"corral unfounded speculation regarding the correct legal standard." Id. at 434. In fact, for this
author, these aspects of Mr. Vollmer's very effective presentation carried the day for the
opposing side of the argument.
450
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factual issues involved in their search for truth.' 4 In the latter context, the
focus of the inquiry becomes whether, in a particular disparate treatment case, a
court can accurately instruct the jury without instructing on pretext. If it
cannot, then the decision not to instruct on pretext is error, regardless of
whether the omitted legal principle articulates an inference.
The question of whether a court can accurately instruct the jury without
instructing on pretext presents both pragmatic and jurisprudential fronts. The
former is a practical, common sense inquiry: Given that, post-Reeves, the law
is clear that a showing of pretext is sufficient to support a finding of
discrimination, is it possible for the jury to "get it" without a specific instruction
on pretext? The latter question is more esoteric: Is it possible for an instruction
that omits pretext to fully and accurately instruct the jury regarding the law that
must be applied in a disparate treatment case?
Certainly, from a pragmatic standpoint, there is good reason to be
concerned about juries' ability to understand the inference of discriminatory
animus that may flow from a showing of pretext. I am not aware of any jury or
social science research documenting that jury confusion over pretext is truly a
concern, but as Mr. Vollmer points out, the potential for such confusion is
corroborated by the split in the circuits that prompted the Supreme Court to
grant certiorari in Reeves.35 The confusion manifested byjurists over the issue
of "pretext-plus" lends real force to the argument that a jury is likely to make a
mistake regarding the potential legal import of its conclusion that the
defendant's proffered reason for its employment decision is false. As Mr.
Vollmer suggests,36 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
seems to concur,37 this potential for confusion is the crux of the argument that a
34. 9A CHARLEs A. WIUGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2556 (2d ed. 1995).
35. Vollmer, supra note 10, at 415-16. Judge Brorby, a detractor of this view, suggests in
his dissent in Townsend that "[w]hile the question of how much weight should be given to
evidence of pretext in discrimination cases has proven thorny for legal professionals, I doubt the
jury viewed this case as anything more than a trial to decide which party is telling the truth."
Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1247 (Brorby, J., dissenting). This
begs the question, however, because at issue in the pretext realm is not simply the question of
whether the defendant is telling the truth, but also the possible legal ramifications of the
determination that the defendant is indeed not telling the truth.
36. Vollmer, supra note 10, at 432-34.
37. See BriefofAmicus Curiae Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 14-15,
Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that a jury
could easily become confused regarding its ability to infer discrimination) (on file with the
author).
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pretext instruction is necessary to "corral ''38 unfounded juror speculation
regarding what is required to prove intentional discrimination.39
At this point, it is tempting to end the analysis of the problem. If one
cannot assume that, in the exercise of common sense, juries will see that the
employer's lying is enough to support the conclusion that it acted
discriminatorily, then surely a jury instruction is necessary. And yet, the
possibility ofjuror confusion about pretext, taken in a vacuum, is probably not
enough to carry the day. The risk of juror confusion arguably flows from the
failure to instruct on any permissible inference, and possibly from the failure to
give any discretionary instruction. The potential for jury confusion matters
only if the absence of the disputed instruction results in the charge as a whole
failing to convey "a clear and correct understanding of the applicable law.."
40
Accordingly, the argument in favor of a pretext instruction must be grounded in
a showing that an understanding of the legal implications of pretext is necessary
to the jury's ability to fully comprehend the law that applies in a disparate
treatment case.
At first blush, this seems to be a difficult case to make. In recent years,
commentators have begun to regard the McDonnell Douglas tripartite structure
as antiquated and irrelevant, at least insofar as it relates to how a jury should
understand a disparate treatment case.4' This perspective finds some support in
38. This wonderful metaphor is Mr. Vollmer's creation. Vollmer, supra note 10, at 435.
39. Mr. Vollmer and the EEOC are not alone in emphasizing pre-Reeves confusion as
grounds for requiring the instruction. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit remarked:
If it is to be assumed that jurors have ordinary intelligence, it may not be assumed
that they are students of the law. The task of the jury, to apply the rules of law as
given by the court below, certainly cannot be satisfactorily accomplished... in the
abstract. Without a charge on pretext, the course of the jury's deliberations will
depend on whether the jurors are smart enough or intuitive enough to realize that
inferences of discrimination may be drawn from the evidence establishing
plaintiff's prima facie case and the pretextual nature of the employer's proffered
reasons for its actions. It does not denigrate the intelligence ofourjurors to suggest
that they need some instruction in the permissibility of drawing that inference.
Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 281 (3rd Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
40. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 34, at § 2556 (stating that the particular form or
wording of a jury instruction is within the court's discretion as long as it conveys a clear
understanding of the applicable law and does not confuse the jurors).
41. See, e.g., Chin & Golinsky, supra note 4, at 668-72 (describing the tripartite test as
wrought with cumbersome and meaningless formalities that make the inquiry confusing to
courts and jurors alike); Stephen W. Smith, Title VI's National Anthem: Is There a Prima
Facie Casefor the Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371,371 (1997) (questioning whether the
McDonnell Douglas three-step approach accomplishes a useful purpose for anyone other than
the publishers of the Federal Reporters), all cited in White, supra note 4, at 711 n. 11; Kenneth
R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment Discrimination
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recent decisions in which the Supreme Court, when discussing the application of
the tripartite formula in the context of an assessment of the ultimate question of
discriminatory intent, dismisses the formulation as irrelevant to the ultimate
burdens in the case.42 Moreover, lower courts have adhered to this notion and, in
the decade since the jury trial became available to Title VII plaintiffs, have largely
eschewed the tripartite formula in their jury instructions in favor of conclusion-
driven instructions requiring the jury to simply determine whether the plaintiff's
protected status was "a motivating factor" in the challenged decision. 43 It is
possible, however, that lower courts have gone too far in tossing aside McDonnell
Douglas's proof structure in favor of a naked assessment of the "ultimate
question." A close reading of Hicks and Reeves suggests that the Supreme Court
still seems to consider pretext (and the potential of its implicit linkage to the
prima facie case) as a fundamental aspect of discrimination proof.
As Mr. Vollmer correctly points out,44 Title VII does not define "intentional
discrimination," nor do the Supreme Court decisions interpreting the statute.
Moreover, locating discriminatory intent is undeniably a difficult proposition,
requiring the divination of internal and often secret motivations. 45  The
McDonnell Douglas line of cases is notable in that it establishes, virtually sui
generis, a proof structure, complete with elements, burdens, and presumptions,
that is intended to enable the project of locating and pinning down an inherently
elusive factual proposition. In that context, the Court's repeated emphasis on
Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 704 (1995) (citing critics that fault the McDonnell Douglas
approach "for its insistence onjamnming facts into an inapt mold and for its unwieldy complexity
which displaces reasoned determinations with the vagaries of befuddled jurors"); Deborah C.
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2237
(1995) (suggesting that, after Hicks, the McDonnell Douglas proof structure has become an
empty ritual that does nothing the normal rules of civil procedure cannot do and that it would be
better to abandon it rather than repair it).
42. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993) (noting that once
the defendant has carried his burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas framework is no
longer relevant).
43. See, e.g., EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 5.01 &
cmts. (2001) (specifying that to win a disparate treatment case a plaintiff must show that
membership in a protected group was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision);
NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 12.1 & cmts. (2001) (same);
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Civil) § 1.2.1 (2000) (stating that a
plaintiff must show that discrimination was a "substantial or motivating factor"); see also
DEVITr ET AL., supra note 9, § 104.04 (requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant
intentionally discriminated).
44. Vollmer, supra note 10, at 434 n.176 (citing White, supra note 4, at 749).
45. See Sturm, supra note 18, at 459-60 ("Smoking guns... are largely things of the
past .... Cognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of interaction have
replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of much continued inequality.").
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the role of pretext takes on a special weight. In fact, it is arguable that the
assessment of pretext (along with the prima facie case) is the requisite format
for the discernment of discriminatory intent.
To make this point, it is necessary to consider McDonnell Douglas's prima
facie case/pretext construct and the relationship of that construct to proof of
discrimination vel non. As an initial matter, courts employ the prima facie case
merely to force the employer out of the weeds, so to speak.46 Its elements are
fluid,47 and its mission is to identify the bare circumstances that eliminate
traditionally valid reasons for an employment action, such as poor performance
or lack of qualifications.48 Although at its inception the prima facie case is
deemed to give rise to an inference of discrimination,49 it is clear that once the
burden of production demanded by the prima facie case is met, any legal
presumption of discrimination drops out of the case. 50 However, this does not
mean that the prima facie elements lose what inherent vigor they may have as
indicia of discrimination.
In fact, although the current Court is wont to declare that the McDonnell
Douglas tripartite proof structure is "irrelevant" at the third stage of the case,
upon closer examination it seems that the Court still embraces the Burdine
Court's twenty-year-old perspective on the potential impact of the prima facie
case's linkage with a showing of pretext:
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that
the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory explanation by
the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination
arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence and
inferences properly drawn there from may be considered by the trier of fact
on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual. Indeed,
46. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11 (describing the presumption flowing from the prima
facie case as having the "role of forcing the defendant to come forward with some response");
Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981) (discussing the
relationship between the plaintiff s prima facie case and the defendant's burden of production).
47. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n.6 (stating that the prima facie proof required from a
plaintiff is flexible and therefore may vary from case to case); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n. 13 (1973) (noting that factual requirements will differ from case to
case).
48. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 ("The prima facie case serves an important function
in the litigation: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs
rejection.").
49. Id. at 254.
50. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993) ("The presumption,
having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come forward with some response, simply
drops out of the picture.").
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there may be some cases where the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined
with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit
the defendant's explanation.
51
This is not a far cry from the current Court's articulation of the matter in
Reeves, a case that was tried to a jury: "The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons
put forward by the defendant (particularly if the disbelief is accompanied by the
suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie
case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. 5 2 Thus, even when focusing
on the ultimate question of discrimination, the Court seems inevitably to return
to the prima facie case and the potential that inheres in its coupling with a
showing of pretext.
This necessarily raises the question of how to square the Court's
continuing resort to McDonnell Douglas's prima facie case/pretext analysis
with the Court's equally clear statements that in disparate treatment cases the
McDonnell Douglas formulation is irrelevant after the second stage because the
operative question is the existence of"discrimination vel non."53 Certainly the
Court's post-McDonnell Douglas jurisprudence reflects that juries need not be
made to understand the machinations of the tripartite burden-shifting analysis.
But at the same time, the Court continues to teach that when attempting to
discern discriminatory intent, particular attention must be paid to the prima
facie case/pretext formulation. It is only sensible to assume that the Court
keeps returning to this formulation not because pretext gives rise to just another
permissible inference, but rather because in cases where pretext is an issue, this
formulation is the right tool to employ in assessing whether a particular
plaintiff s ultimate burden of proof has been met.
54
Those who have taken introductory physics know that light seen by the
naked eye as merely white, or simply bright, is actually comprised of the entire
51. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
52. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (quoting Hicks,
509 U.S. at 511).
53. See id. at 142-43 (stating that, after the employer articulated its legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason, the McDonnell Douglas framework disappeared "and the sole
remaining issue was 'discrimination vel non"'); Hicks, 509 U.S. at 518-19 (explaining that once
the defendant offers evidence of the reason for its decision, what remains for the fact finder is
the "ultimate" question of "discrimination vel non"); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,714 (1983) (stating that the ultimate question is one of discrimination vel
non).
54. Of course, the court need not specifically instruct thejury on the prima facie case and
its connection to pretext. This is not because the prima facie case is unimportant, however, but
rather because its existence is implicitly subsumed in the pretext instruction and probably in the
instruction on the plaintiff's burden as well.
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color spectrum. When directed through a prism, the light is broken into its
component parts and its true colors are revealed. A pretext instruction plays
much the same role. It does not counsel a fimding of discrimination when
discrimination is not revealed. It merely equips the jury with the tools it needs
to fully assess the possible legal implications of the facts they have discerned.
At bottom, an intuitive understanding of the implications of McDonnell
Douglas's prima facie case/pretext linkage is essential to the fact-finder's
understanding of the law that applies in a disparate treatment case. The Third
Circuit in Smith v. Borough of Wilkinson55 was correct: "[T]he jury must be
given the legal context in which it is to find and apply the facts."5 6 So long as
McDonnell Douglas and its third step prima facie case/pretext linkage retains
vitality, it is difficult to see why the jury should not be enlightened to the same
extent the courts are, so that the jury may apply the law to the facts with the
same degree of discernment.
57
IV. Arguments of Counsel Cannot Substitute for a Pretext Instruction
While conceding that the inference of discrimination flowing from a
finding of pretext often plays a "primary role" in the location of discriminatory
intent,58 Mr. Vollmer is ultimately persuaded that it warrants no special
treatment at least in part because, to the extent that it is necessary to convey to
the jury the potential significance of a showing of pretext, counsel can argue
the inference. 59  Mr. Vollmer is not alone in reaching this conclusion-
distinguished members of the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh, Eighth, and
(in dissent) Tenth Circuits have embraced the same view. 6° And yet, when
55. Smith v. Borough of Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 1998).
56. Id. at 280.
57. See id. (observing that "[i]t is difficult to understand what end is served by reversing
the grant of summary judgment for the employer on the ground that the jury is entitled to infer
discrimination from pretext ... if the jurors are never informed that they may do so").
58. See Vollmer, supra note 10, at 437 ("[Tihe veracity of the defendant's explanation
should merely play a role, albeit often a primary role, in determining the existence of intentional
discrimination.").
59. See id. at 442 ("A jury will likely understand the common sense foundation on its
own, especially after hearing argument on the issue from plaintiff's counsel.").
60. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1246-47 (10th Cir.
2002) (Brorby, J., dissenting) (stating that Townsend's attorney's arguments were enough to
inform the jury that they could infer discrimination if they thought Kemper's explanation was
pretext); Moore v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786,791 (8th Cir. 2001) (rationalizing
that refusal to submit a pretext instruction to the jury was not prejudicial because Moore had the
opportunity to raise the issue in opening and closing statements); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43
F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that rather than describing each permissible inference, the
THE IMPERATIVE OF INSTR UCTING ON PRETEXT
viewed critically, it is possible to conclude that even these jurists may be
overstating the role that the arguments of counsel can actually play in educating
the jury about the potential impact of a finding of pretext.
Although a plaintiff's counsel may be permitted in closing to argue that
the defendant's stated reason for it decision is demonstrably false, 6' it is not at
all clear that, in the absence of a pretext instruction, counsel will be permitted
to argue that, as a matter of law, the conclusion that the defendant is lying can
be sufficient to support a finding of the ultimate fact in the case. It is well-
established that it is the role of the court, not counsel, to instruct the jury as to
the applicable law.62 In fact, courts differ widely on the propriety of counsel
arguing law to the jury at all.63
Moreover, federal trial courts inform counsel of their proposed action
upon requested instructions prior to closing arguments. 64 A plaintiff who has
been denied a pretext instruction would argue the potential legal effect of the
defendant's mendacity at her peril. At a minimum, she could be seen as
directly flouting the court's ruling, drawing the court's ire and risking rebuke in
front of the jury.65 Indeed, a number of federal courts hold that counsel's
argument must be limited to the instructions given and that it is error for the
judge may, and usually should, leave it to the argument of counsel).
61. In closing arguments, counsel is certainly afforded "wide latitude" to draw inferences
from the evidence. JACOB A. STEIN, CLOSING ARGUMENT: THE ART AND THE LAW § 15, at 43
(1996). Thus, counsel can suggest that because the proffered reason has been contradicted the
jury can legitimately infer that the proffered reason is false, or "pretextual," and in some courts
plaintiffs may be permitted to go so far as to state outright that the defendant is lying. See id.
("[l]f the evidence suggests it, counsel may infer that one of the two sides is lying.") (citing
United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1991)).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 189 F.3d 640, 648 (7th Cir. 1999) ("If [the
defendant] felt that the district court had not adequately and fairly instructed the jury then he
should have challenged the court's instructions at the appropriate time rather than resorting to
self-help during closing arguments. Only the judge may instruct the jury.")
63. STEIN, supra note 61, § 20, at 68.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 51. Proposed amendments to FRCP 51 make the point even more
emphatically, correcting the current rule's failure to account for the fact that the court itself may
propose instructions in addition to or other than those proposed by counsel: "The court...
must inform the parties of its proposed instructions and proposed action on the requests [by
counsel for instructions] before instructing the jury and before final jury arguments .... See
2003 U.S. ORDER 20 (C.O. 20), FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AMENDMENTS TO RULES
23,51,53, 54,71 A; FORMS 19,31 AND 32 (Mar. 27,2003) (effective Dec. 1, 2003) (introducing
proposed FRCP 51 (b)(I)).
65. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. WEGNER ETAL, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIViLTRIALS AND
EVIDENCE 13.51 (2003) ("Make sure your argument tracks the exact language of the
instruction. Any material deviation is likely to draw rebuke from the court and undermine your
credibility with the jury.").
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district court to permit argument on issues of law for which it has refused
instructions.66
In light of these constraints on parties' ability to argue law not
encompassed in the instructions, the fact that a court permits counsel to suggest
that the defendant's articulated reason is a pretext is small solace. The refusal
of a court to instruct on pretext leaves the plaintiff able to point out the lie, but
foreclosed from explaining to the jury that if they deem the lie sufficiently
revelatory, they need no more evidence to locate discriminatory intent.
V. Conclusion
The issue that Mr. Vollmer raises in his excellent Note is difficult and
quite subtle. The role of pretext in discrimination cases is both central and
masked. As a result, the question of how (or if) to charge the jury on pretext
presents no obvious answer. Ultimately, its resolution will require locating the
wavering line between fundamental principals of law and those principals that
are more in the nature ofjudicial gloss; balancing the need to preserve courts'
discretion in overseeing the conduct of trials with the need to empower juries to
make informed decisions; and, perhaps most importantly, crafting an approach
that will ensure that the policies that undergird Title VII are manifest through
an orderly and credible jurisprudence of the law of discrimination. Although I
advocate for a position different from the one that Mr. Vollmer advocates, his
clear exegesis brings home the fact that the question is a very close one. Mr.
Vollmer's Note is eminently deserving of the award it received.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398, 401 (11th Cir. 1996) ("For arguing
points of law, we have held that counsel is confined to law that is included in the judge's charge
to the jury."); United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 106 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("In arguing the law
to the jury, counsel is confined to principles that will later be incorporated and charged to the
jury."); United States v. Sawyer, 443 F.2d 712, 714 n.! I (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("Before stating a
legal principle, counsel should be sure that it will in fact be included in the charge. If there is
any question about the accuracy or relevance of counsel's proposed statement of law, he should
seek a ruling on the point before going forward with the argument.").
